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INSURER SUBROGATION IN
WISCONSIN: THE GOOD HANDS
(OR A NEIGHBOR) IN
ANOTHER'S SHOES
JOHN J. KIRCHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Early in the development of Wisconsin jurisprudence, it
became established principle that when a fire insurer paid its
insured for a loss covered by its policy it had a right of action
against the person who wrongfully caused the loss, without
the need for any formal assignment of the insured's claim
against the wrongdoer.' The Wisconsin Supreme Court later
explained the doctrinal foundation for this principle of insurer
subrogation as follows:
The doctrine aforesaid is based on the theory that in a
contract of fire insurance the company is a surety, and so
upon the general equitable principles of subrogation when it,
as indemnitor, pays a loss caused by the negligence of a third
person its relation with such person is that of surety and
principal obligor. It has all the rights against the latter which
the principal creditor, so to speak, formerly had. The in-
sured has one claim which he can enforce against either
party, but he can have but one satisfaction, and the party
primarily liable is relievable only by assuming the burden.2
There are those who claim that insurer subrogation is
nothing more than a useless, wasteful exercise of trading dol-
* Professor of Law, Marquette University. The author wishes to acknowledge,
with deep gratitude, the helpful comments of Professors James D. Ghiardi and Chris-
tine M. Wiseman on earlier drafts of this article, and the research assistance of Jane
Davis Weida, Marquette University Law School, Class of 1989.
1. Wunderlich v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 93 Wis. 132, 66 N.W. 1144 (1896); Hustis-
ford Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 66 Wis. 58, 28
N.W. 64 (1886); Swarthout v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 49 Wis. 625, 6 N.W. 314 (1880).
These early cases, which involved fire losses resulting from the proclivity of locomotives
of the time to emit burning embers from their smokestacks, would surprise no one fa-
miliar with nineteenth century railroading.
2. Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 36, 116 N.W. 633,
633 (1908). This is generally referred to as "legal" or "equitable" subrogation. COUCH
ON INSURANCE 2D §§ 61:2, 61:3 (rev. ed. 1983).
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lars among insurers who end up paying out as much to other
insurers on these claims as they collect themselves.3 While
the break-even assertion may well be true, subrogation does
have one very important, beneficial function - loss realloca-
tion. With subrogation, the loss falls upon the one who
caused it to occur and not upon the insurance record of the
one who sustained that loss. Without loss reallocation
through subrogation, poor insurance risks would not disap-
pear; they would merely be rendered anonymous in many
cases.
4
This article will trace the evolution of insurer subrogation
law in Wisconsin over the past century and explore doctrinal
problems in the current status of that law. At times the doc-
trinal developments have been somewhat bizarre and have
caused considerable confusion for those who have sought to
understand and apply the law.5 Yet of late, some clarity ap-
pears to have developed which may lead to easier understand-
ing and application in the future.
II. THE LEGAL/CONVENTIONAL SUBROGATION
DICHOTOMY
In the now-famous case of Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec-
tric Railway & Light Co.,6 the supreme court made it clear
that subrogation rights would not arise by operation of law
each time any insurer paid its insured for a loss caused by
another. Gatzweiler brought an action to recover for personal
injuries which he claimed had been caused by the negligence
of the defendant. The defendant answered in abatement that
the plaintiff, when injured, possessed a policy of accident in-
surance to indemnify him against the type of injury he sus-
3. KEETON & O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 70
(1965). See also O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY - No FAULT INSURANCE
FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 77 (1975); FERREIRA. QUANTITATIVE MODELS FOR
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS AND INSURANCE 6 (1970); Denenberg, Subrogation Recov-
ery: Who Is Made Whole?, 29 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 185 (1979); Ghiardi, The Collat-
eral Source Rule: Multiple Recovery in Personal Injury Actions, 535 INS. L. J. 457, 463
(1967).
4. Meyers, Subrogation Rights and Recoveries Arising Out of First Party Contracts,
9 FORUM 83, 84 (1973).
5. It also has not been a stroll in the park for those of us who have tried to teach the
subject.
6. 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633 (1908).
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tained and that the insurer had paid the plaintiff $2,500
because of that injury. The defendant asserted, therefore, that
the plaintiff's insurer was subrogated to the plaintiff's right of
action against the defendant to the extent of the amount it had
paid, and that the action could not properly proceed without
the presence of that insurer.
The court, without articulating the details of the policy
provisions, characterized the policy as being in the nature of
an "investment contract," such as life insurance, where "[t]he
amount stipulated to be paid is a fixed sum as to each particu-
lar injury specified or is computable without any such definite
data as in [the] case of the loss of property."'7 The court con-
cluded that subrogation would arise as a matter of law with
respect to indemnity contracts of insurance, only upon pay-
ment to the insured, and that with investment policies, no sub-
rogation rights would arise unless the parties to the contract
"give it that character by a stipulation ....
The state of the law following Gatzweiler was such that
fire insurance was considered an indemnity contract as to
which legal (a/k/a equitable) subrogation would arise, as a
matter of law, after the insurer made payment to the insured.
Payment under accident insurance would create no subroga-
tion rights for the insurer unless the parties to that insurance
contract made it an indemnity contract by stipulation. Subse-
quently, the court ruled that automobile collision insurance is
similar in principle to fire insurance and, as an indemnity con-
tract, subrogation rights would flow from insurer payment as
a matter of law.9 Liability insurance also was afforded the
same treatment as an indemnity contract. 10
Following Gatzweiler, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
predisposed to knee-jerk each time it encountered a subroga-
tion issue in a case involving a policy which it characterized as
"accident" insurance. It did so even with policies which pro-
vided reimbursement to the insured for actual medical and
hospital expenses. The equation which the court adopted in
7. Id. at 37, 116 N.W. at 634.
8. Id. at 38, 116 N.W. at 634.
9. Patitucci v. Gerhardt, 206 Wis. 358, 361, 240 N.W. 385, 386 (1932).
10. Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 169 Wis. 533, 173
N.W. 307 (1919) (as to the insured's contribution claim against another tortfeasor, and
even though the policy contractually provided for subrogation).
1987]
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these cases appeared to be: "accident" insurance equals "in-
vestment contract" equals no legal subrogation. Much has
changed in the insurance business in the almost eighty years
since Gatzweiler. So-called "accident" policies now referred
to as "accident and health" policies contain provisions to in-
demnify the insured for actual losses sustained. Personal lines
policies such as auto and homeowner's insurance contain
medical payment provisions to do the same. Modern surgi-
cal/hospital coverages, the majority of which are underwrit-
ten on a group basis, were unheard of during the Gatzweiler
era. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's), Preferred
Provider Options (PPO's) and their kind have dramatically
altered basic concepts of insuring health care delivery. Each
indemnifies the insured for actual expenses incurred. The
court, until very recently, has been oblivious to these changes.
As late as 1967, almost sixty years after Gatzweiler, the
court appeared unaware of the indemnity feature of some
modern insurance coverages. In the case of Associated Hospi-
tal Service, Inc. v. Milwaukee Automobile Mutual Insurance
Co.," the court was concerned with a subrogation claim by
the insurer of an automobile accident victim. The insurer
(Blue Cross) paid $479.75 for the medical and hospital ex-
penses of the injured victim. The policy contained a con-
tractual subrogation provision, and the case was concerned
with the validity of that conventional subrogation agree-
ment."z Nevertheless, one would have expected the court to
find that this was an indemnity contract, unlike the invest-
ment-type accident policy in Gatzweiler, and to rule that the
absence or presence of a subrogation provision in the policy
was irrelevant to the rights of the insurer.
The court again employed this form-over-substance ap-
proach in 1978 in the case of Rixmann v. Somerset Public
Schools.13 In that action, a son and his father sought damages
resulting from injuries which the son sustained in a school ac-
11. 33 Wis. 2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225 (1967).
12. The court found no Wisconsin cases "squarely on point," but relied on lan-
guage from Gatziveiler concerning parties to the insurance contract who agreed to make
the investment contract one of indemnity. Id. at 174. 147 N.W.2d at 227. See
Gatzweiler, 136 Wis. at 38, 116 N.W. at 634 and text accompanying note 8. This is
referred to as "contractual" or "conventional" subrogation. See supra note 2.
13. 83 Wis. 2d 571, 266 N.W.2d 326 (1978).
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cident. The trial court refused to allow the father to recover
the medical and hospital expenses that he incurred for his son,
which expenses the father's health insurer paid. On appeal,
the school district argued that the trial court was correct since
the health insurer was subrogated to the father's claim to the
extent of the amount it paid. As if reciting an ancient formula
by rote, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, invoking the
old rule that "[a]n accident insurance policy, in the absence of
an express provision in the policy to the contrary, is held to be
an investment contract ... [under which] the insurance com-
pany is not subrogated to the rights of the insured [upon
payment]." 14
The court apparently believed that some of the confusion
concerning subrogation resulted from an overly broad state-
ment it had made in Heifetz v. Johnson:1 5 "Acceptance of
payment from an insurer operates as an assignment of the
claim to that extent whether or not the policy contains a sub-
rogation agreement." 6 In Rixmann, the court ruled that this
language should not be viewed to suggest that subrogation al-
ways occurs when the injured party accepts an insurance pay-
ment. 1 7 Lost from sight is the fact that Gatzweiler labeled the
policy before it an investment contract, not because it was an
"accident" policy, but because the benefit to be paid was fixed
in advance of the insured's loss rather than computed after the
loss and based upon the extent of that loss.
The Rixmann case presented a ray of hope, however, for
those of us who ardently prayed for court enlightenment. The
supreme court noted that in Wisconsin, the one seeking to
prove subrogation has the burden of introducing evidence to
that effect. 8 In that regard it noted that the Rixmann insur-
ance contract was never made part of the record. These state-
ments obviously refer to the presence or absence of an express
subrogation provision in the Rixmann policy. However, the
14. Id. at 582, 266 N.W.2d at 331-32 (citing Patitucci, 206 Wis. at 358, 240 N.W. at
386).
15. 61 Wis. 2d 111, 124, 211 N.W.2d 834, 841 (1973).
16. Id.
17. Rixmann, 83 Wis. 2d at 579, 266 N.W.2d at 330 (1978).
18. Id. at 582, 266 N.W.2d at 332 (citing Karl v. Employers Ins., 78 Wis. 2d 284,
254 N.W.2d 255 (1977)); Rennick v. Fruehauf Corp., 82 Wis. 2d 793, 264 N.W.2d 264
(1978).
1987]
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concept of examining the policy when subrogation is at issue
provided a key for developments in the law to follow.
The first development came in 1985, in the case of Cun-
ningham v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 9 In Cunning-
ham, the court gave further emphasis to the importance of
examining the policy provisions to determine an insurer's
subrogation rights. Cunningham's daughter was seriously in-
jured in an automobile accident. She was hospitalized for her
injuries and died four months following the accident. Cun-
ningham, along with his dependents, was covered under a
group insurance policy with Metropolitan issued through his
employer. The group policy contained two riders:
(1) "Group Hospitalization and Physicians' Service Benefits
Insurance Rider" and (2) "Group Medical Expenses Insur-
ance-Extended Coverage." Metropolitan paid Cunningham
over $80,000 in benefits, representing medical expenses
which he incurred as a result of the injuries to his daughter.
Cunningham made and settled claims for the wrongful
death of his daughter against third-party tortfeasors, includ-
ing the liability insurer of the automobile in which his daugh-
ter was riding at the time of the accident. The parties agreed
that $20,000 of the settlement proceeds from the liability in-
surer would be held in a trust account pending a judicial de-
termination of Metropolitan's subrogation rights. The parties
stipulated that the policy contained no coventional subroga-
tion provision. The policy, in its entirety, was appended to the
agreed statement of facts submitted to the trial court. The
trial court found that the group policy was one of indemnity
and the insurer was entitled to subrogation. The parties sub-
sequently stipulated to a supplementary statement of facts
based upon that determination. They agreed that Cunning-
ham had been made whole by Metropolitan's payments, the
settlement proceeds of the wrongful death claim, and further
settlement proceeds from another contributing tortfeasor °
An additional sum in excess of $5,000, representing a portion
of another settlement from a contributing tortfeasor, was
placed in the trust account. The trial court then ordered judg-
ment for Metropolitan as the subrogated insurer. The court of
19. 121 Wis. 2d 437, 360 N.W.2d 33 (1985).
20. See infra discussion in Section V.
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appeals affirmed, relying on Rixmann, and determined that
the applicable provisions of the group policy provided cover-
age "for the actual medical expenses incurred" rather than for
a "fixed sum upon the occurrence of a specified event."'"
The supreme court was thus confronted with the issue of
whether the insurer, absent an express subrogation provision
in the policy, was subrogated to the extent of its payment
under the two policy riders. The court began its analysis of
the issue by providing a summary of its previous holdings on
insurer subrogation, including the indemnity/investment dis-
tinction as to legal subrogation. The court then noted: "The
investment-indemnity contract distinction has historically
turned upon more than merely the measurement of liability,
whether it be measured by fixed sum or by the extent of the
insured's loss. The availability of subrogation has generally
depended on the type of coverage involved . ,,.I Without
citing to Wisconsin authority, the court explained its state-
ment by referring to decisions from other jurisdictions and
views of text writers, and by stating that courts have implied
subrogation rights with policies of property insurance, but
have not done so with personal insurance contracts such as
life, medical, hospital and accident benefits. The court noted
that the unwillingness of courts in general to imply subroga-
tion into personal insurance contracts may be due to their rec-
ognition that "the insured's receipt of both tort damages and
insurance benefits may not produce a duplicative result given
that the insured is likely to have suffered intangible losses that
are not indemnified by either the insurer or the third-party
tortfeasor. '2 3
The court observed that while its past decisions had not
explicitly embraced the property versus personal insurance
distinctions, they had "nonetheless proven to be entirely con-
sistent with the general trends in each of these areas." 4 How
21. Cunningham, 121 Wis. 2d at 443, 360 N.W.2d at 36 (quoting Cunningham v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 331, 336, 342 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Ct. App. 1983)).
22. Cunningham, 121 Wis. 2d at 447, 360 N.W.2d at 38.
23. Id. at 448, 360 N.W.2d at 38. Considering the broad spectrum of tort damages
now recoverable, this possibility should be examined on a case-by-case basis.
24. Id. (citing Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927) and Thore-
son v. Milwaukee & S. Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972)). Both
Campbell and Thoreson are really collateral source rule cases, see infra Section IV, and
1987]
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Wisconsin has been consistent with the trends in these areas is
difficult to discern.
Nevertheless, the court then turned its attention to the is-
sue before it - whether the insurer was subrogated absent an
express policy provision. In conducting its analysis of this is-
sue, the court found that its decision in Rixmann was the key:
While Metropolitan argues that subrogation rights
should be implied upon payments of benefits for medical and
hospital expenses given the true indemnity nature of these
types of contracts, this court has declined to do so in
Rixmann, and we decline to do so now. The Rixmann
court, like every court which has considered this question,
was unwilling to find, in the absence of an express subroga-
tion clause, and without the benefit of the policy in the rec-
ord, that the insurer was subrogated to the extent of its
payments made to the insured's rights to recover medical ex-
penses from the third party tortfeasor.
We read Rixmann to hold that when a policy is included
in the record, the court must first look at the policy in ques-
tion to determine into which category it falls. We reject
Cunningham's argument, however, that the policy which in-
cludes life insurance, accident and health insurance, and
medical coverage must be construed as a whole. We ex-
amine only those portions of the policy under which the in-
surer paid the insured for all of the medical expenses,
including hospitalization, and for which Metropolitan is
presently seeking subrogation. We therefore limit our in-
quiry into the "Group Hospitalization and Physicians' Serv-
ices Benefits Rider" issued in 1971 and the "Group Medical
Expense Insurance-Extended Coverage" rider issued in
1973.25
The court then found a provision in each rider which allowed
it to determine the investment/indemnity issue. It noted that
the Group Medical rider, as to insurer reimbursement,
provided:
If benefits have been paid hereunder on account of serv-
ices received by the Employee or by a Dependent and there-
after it is established that the charges for such services were
not paid by the Employee or the Dependent, or said Em-
have no bearing on investment/indemnity or property/personal insurance subrogation
issues.
25. Cunningham, 121 Wis. 2d at 449-50, 360 N.W.2d at 39 (citation omitted).
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ployee or Dependent was otherwise reimbursed therefor, the
Insurance Company shall be entitled to a refund of the
amount of the benefits paid which is in excess of the benefits
that would have been payable based on the actual charges
incurred and paid by the Employee or the Dependent.26
However, the Group Hospitalization rider provided:
The hospitalization benefits otherwise provided for any
hospital confinement of the Employee shall be reduced by
any benefits paid or payable on account of hospital confine-
ment for the same period or any part thereof from any fund,
other insurance, or other arrangement, provided or estab-
lished in conformity with any state or other governmental dis-
ability or cash sickness or hospital benefits law.2 7
Based upon these two provisions the court determined that
the Group Medical rider was an indemnity contract as to
which subrogation would arise even without an express subro-
gation provision. Furthermore, the Group Hospitalization
rider was an investment contract with no subrogation rights
for the insurer, unless the contract expressly so provided. The
distinction was based upon the court's finding that, under the
Medical rider, Metropolitan was entitled to reimbursement if
the benefits it paid were duplicated from any other source,
whereas under the Hospitalization rider, this would occur
only if duplication resulted from some form of governmental
benefit law. In addition, the reimbursement provision of the
Hospitalization rider only applied to employee hospitalization
and not to that of a dependent. The case was remanded for a
determination of what sums Metropolitan paid under each of
the riders and how much of the funds held in trust were in-
tended to compensate Cunningham for medical expenses
which Metropolitan previously paid under the rider so as to
entitle it to subrogation.
The current status of the indemnity/investment distinction
following Cunningham appears to indicate that if evidence of
the content of the insurance contract is not presented to a
court, prior, gross groupings of insurance will be employed.
Thus, fire insurance, collision insurance, liability insurance,
and possibly any other form of property insurance will, with
26. Id. at 450-51, 360 N.W.2d at 39.
27. Id. at 452, 360 N.W.2d at 40 (emphasis added).
1987]
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payment by the insurer, produce legal (a/k/a equitable) sub-
rogation. With all other forms of insurance (an "accident" or
other type of "personal" policy) subrogation will not arise
from payment as a matter of law and can only occur if the
policy expressly provides for conventional (a/k/a contrac-
tual) subrogation. However, with non-property forms of in-
surance, if the policy is produced so that it may be examined
by the court, the court will find it to be an indemnity contract
if it provides for insurer reimbursement when the insured re-
ceives duplicate payments from any other source.2 8
At present, whether an insurance contract of the "per-
sonal" policy type is an indemnity contract for purposes of
subrogation is not dependent upon whether the policy seeks to
provide benefits to the insured for actual, out-of-pocket ex-
penses incurred. This appears to be a form of judicial coordi-
nation of benefits. One is tempted to agree with Justice
Abrahamson, in her partial dissent to Cunningham, that the
best solution to the tenuous indemnity/investment distinction,
which courts appear inept to apply, would be for the court to
rule that in the absence of an express subrogation provision,
an insurer has no subrogation rights.2 9 Absent the supreme
28. In Lambert v. Wrensch, 135 Wis. 2d 105, 399 N.W.2d 369 (1987) the court
found a policy reimbursement provision similar to that held in Cunningham to make
the contract one of indemnity and thus held subrogation exists as a matter of law. The
language considered by the court in Lambert was:
If you or your dependent incur expenses on account of bodily injury or sickness,
caused by the negligence or wrong of a third-party with respect to which benefits
are payable in accordance with the provisions of the policy, you may take such
benefits under this plan; provided that, if there is a recovery by you or your
dependents (or a personal representative) from the third-party or his personal
representative, whether by judgment, settlement or otherwise, on account of
such bodily injury or sickness, you shall reimburse The Equitable to the extent
of the total amount of such benefits paid under this plan, but not in an amount in
excess of the proceeds of any such recovery after the deduction of reasonable and
necessary expenditures, including attorney's fees, incurred in effecting such
recovery.
Id. at 116, 399 N.W.2d at 374. However, this reimbursement provision appears more
limited than that of the Group Medical rider in Cunningham.
29. Cunningham, 121 Wis. 2d at 456-57, 360 N.W.2d at 42. However. the tempta-
tion is not too great. Of course, most insurers prepare their policy forms for use in
many jurisdictions and some jurisdictions prohibit subrogation, even contractual, if its
use would amount to splitting a cause of action for personal injuries. See. eag.. Brock-
man v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 125 Ariz. 246, 609 P.2d 61 (1980); Klimvakis v.
Caruso, 54 A.D.2d 972, 388 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1976); Schuldt v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 89 S.D. 687, 238 N.W.2d 270 (1975).
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court's adoption of her suggestion, or employment by the in-
surance industry of express subrogation provisions in most
policies, doubt will continue as to the ability of the supreme
court to ever understand the nature of indemnity insurance.
Nevertheless, the majority in Cunningham has created a
new definition of "indemnity" which is clearly contrary to the
long-standing concept of that term as understood by those
who have even a passing knowledge of insurance. What the
court may be saying, at least for now, is that to be considered
an "indemnity" contract, the non-property policy should pro-
vide for insurer reimbursement by the insured if the latter also
gains a recovery from the tortfeasor for the same loss. The net
effect of such a provision, akin to a trust agreement, is subro-
gation in indirection.
III. SUBROGATED INSURER As AN INDISPENSABLE
PARTY
When an insurer becomes subrogated to a portion of the
claim of its insured against some third party tortfeasor, con-
sideration must be given to the potential lawsuit which the
insured might later bring against the tortfeasor and the in-
surer's involvement in that lawsuit. One of the earliest Wis-
consin cases to consider this issue was Patitucci v. Gerhardt.°
The action was commenced to recover for damage caused to
the plaintiff's automobile as the result of its collision with a
vehicle driven by the defendant. At trial, cross-examination
of the plaintiff revealed that he carried collision insurance on
his car; that the policy provided for the payment of collision
damage less a deductible; and, that the insurer had paid the
plaintiff for the damage to his vehicle, less the deductible
amount. Judgment was entered against the defendant for the
full amount of damage to the plaintiff's automobile. On ap-
peal the defendant contended that, based upon the informa-
tion which was elicited at trial through cross-examination, the
plaintiff's recoverable damages should have been limited to
the amount of the deductible. In the alternative, the defend-
30. 206 Wis. 358, 240 N.W. 385 (1932). See also Sims v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 101
Wis. 586, 77 N.W. 908 (1899); Allen v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 94 Wis. 93, 68
N.W. 873 (1896); Wunderlich v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 93 Wis. 132, 66 N.W.
1144 (1896); Pratt v. Radford, 52 Wis. 114, 8 N.W. 606 (1881).
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ant argued that the plaintiff's insurer was a necessary party to
the complete determination of the controversy and that no
judgment for any amount could be properly entered against
the defendant without the presence of the insurer as a party to
the action.
The supreme court framed the issue presented by Patitucci
in terms of whether failure to join a subrogated insurer is a
mere defect in parties, such as is waived by the failure to ob-
ject by answer or demurrer, or whether the situation is one in
which the presence of the insurer is indispensable to a com-
plete determination of the controversy. It found the latter to
be the case:
The claim against the defendant by reason of his tortious act
has been said to be indivisible and to be based upon a single
liability. By operation of law the ownership of a part of this
claim has become vested in the insurance company by rea-
son of its payment of the loss. If this presents to the court a
single controversy, it must be apparent that a complete de-
termination of it cannot be had without the presence of all of
the parties who together own the cause of action. When it is
further considered that sub. (4) of sec. 260.19 requires that a
liberal construction be given to the section, to the end that
closely related contentions may be disposed of in one action,
even though in a strict sense there be two controversies, and
when it is further considered that the obligation on the part
of the trial court to bring in indispensable parties is one that
exists independently of any motion by either party, it must
be apparent that sec. 260.19 has a larger objective than
merely the protection of the parties to the action. It is the
apparent intention of the legislature that single controversies
shall be determined in one action, for the purpose of promot-
ing expedition and economy in the administration of
justice.3
31. Patitucci, 206 Wis. at 362, 240 N.W. at 386. Subsection (4) of Wis. S-rAX. §
260.19 (1929), the joinder statute applicable at the time, provided:
(4) This section shall be liberally construed in order that, so far as practica-
ble, all closely related contentions may be disposed of in one action, even though
in the strict sense there be two controversies, provided the contentions relate to
the same general subject and separate actions would subject either of the parties
to the danger of double liability or serious hardship.
[Vol. 71:33
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The court held that if sec. 260.19 was to be given application
to actions at law,3 2 there could be no more appropriate situa-
tion in which to do so than where a single cause of action
exists, but ownership of the cause of action is vested in several
persons by reason of partial assignments. It found this espe-
cially true in those cases where the assignment occurs by oper-
ation of the principles of subrogation.
The court in Patitucci ruled that when in the course of the
trial it comes to the attention of the court that an insurer has
an interest in the cause of action, "we think it [is] the duty of
the court, upon its own motion, to stay proceedings and to
order the insurance company made a party. ' ' 33 The court
made it clear, however, that alternatives exist if the matter of
insurer subrogation is not brought to the attention of the trial
court:
In such a situation the defendant, either because he paid the
judgment without knowledge of the fact that an insurer had
paid for part of the loss, or because of the fact that the pay-
ment was involuntary, would doubtless be protected by the
judgment, upon the ground, in the first case, that the insurer,
not having notified the tortfeasor of its claim, could not com-
plain, and in the second case, that the compulsion of the
judgment would prevent the payment of the full sum to the
insured from operating as a fraud upon the insurer. In such
a case the insured would recover the entire amount and hold
such portion as properly belongs to the insurance company
as trustee.3
4
The court also noted that the problem of a new trial could be
avoided in Patitucci if the insurer filed either a release of its
claim or an assignment of its rights to its insured, the
plaintiff.35
32. Patitucci, 206 Wis. at 362, 240 N.W.2d at 386. The court found that § 260.19
was borrowed from the old rules governing equity actions and with the law/equity
merger it was a fair conclusion that it was applicable to all actions. Id.
33. Id. at 363, 240 N.W. at 387.
34. Id. at 363, 240 N.W. at 386-87.
35. This was given as a practical method of avoiding a new trial after judgment in
this action. It may not have worked, however, if a plea in abatement had been entered
to the action before trial. Truesdill v. Roach, 11 Wis. 2d 492, 498-99, 105 N.W.2d 871,
874-75, (1960). Absent a plea in abatement the problem of non-joinder of a subrogated
insurer may be obviated if, before verdict, the insurer disclaims the right of subroga-
tion or assigns that right to the insured. Leonard v. Bottomley, 210 Wis. 411. 245 N.W.
849 (1933).
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All of the above, of course, must be considered in light of
the determination in Frederick v. Great Northern Railway,36
made that same day. In Frederick, the court described the
insurer as being subrogated "pro tanto" to the rights of the
insured and made it clear that by stepping into the insured's
shoes the insurer cannot recover as assignee by operation of
law when the insured could not recover.3 7 This is a very im-
portant principle which must be understood for a proper anal-
ysis of subrogation issues. Subrogation results in nothing
more or less than the substitution of the insurer for its in-
sured. Thus the subrogated insurer's rights are no better or
worse than were those of its insured before the subrogation
occurred. All defenses previously available against the in-
sured are therefore available against the subrogated insurer.
The subrogated insurer becomes, as it were, the alter ego of its
insured.
The impact of the failure of the insured to join a subro-
gated insurer in the acton against an alleged tortfeasor was
again before the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Heifetz v. John-
son.38 In this action, however, the absence of the subrogated
insurer was not called to the attention of the trial court until
more than three years after the harm was sustained by the
insured.39 Although the insured's action had been timely
commenced, 4° the trial court ruled that the failure to join the
subrogated insurer could not be corrected, as to that insurer,
since the statute of limitations had run on its claim. The
supreme court agreed, noting that the running of a statute of
limitations extinguishes not only the right of action but also
the cause of action. 41 However, the supreme court considered
36. 207 Wis. 234, 240 N.W. 387 (1932) (reported later due to a motion for
rehearing).
37. Id. at 245, 240 N.W.2d at 391.
38. 61 Wis. 2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).
39. Since with subrogation the insurer steps into the shoes of the insured, the stat-
ute of limitations applicable to the subrogation claim is the same as is applicable to the
claim of its insured. See Frederick. 207 Wis. 234, 240 N.W. 387.
40. Heifetz, 61 Wis. 2d at 113, 211 N.W.2d at 835. The insured was injured in an
auto accident on October 21, 1968, and commenced the action on October 12. 1971,
within the three years provided by WIS. STAT. § 893.205(1) (1971). Also see further
discussion of the statute of limitations in subrogation cases commencing at p. 70 infra.
41. Heifetz, 61 Wis. 2d at 115, 211 N.W.2d at 836 (relying on Borde v. Hake. 44
Wis. 2d 22, 32, 170 N.W.2d 768, 772 (1969)). It appears that this conclusion and the
reliance on Borde were erroneous since the real-party-in-interest rule, purely proce-
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the real issue to be whether the cause of action of the insured
also had been extinguished by the failure to join the subro-
gated insurer before the statute had run as to its claim. If the
commencement of a lawsuit without joining an indispensable
party is so defective as to deprive the court of jurisdiction,
then the statute of limitations would not have been tolled by
the insured's service of process and the insured would be
barred from suing the defendant.
The court noted that there was a split in the authorities as
to whether an objection to the lack of an indispensable party is
jurisdictional in nature. The court aligned itself with those
authorities holding that absence of an indispensable party is
not jurisdictional and withdrew any of its prior statements to
the contrary. It did, however, note one exception to the gen-
eral rule. That exception occurs when one of several joint
owners of a claim brings an action and, after the statute of
limitations has run, attempts to bring in the other joint own-
ers. The court noted, however, that the situation of a subro-
gated insurer and its insured is not really analogous:
However, it can be seen that they are not really joint owners
in the same sense as the joint payees of a note. Each actually
owns separately a part of the liability of the tort-feasor. The
insurer has a claim only for the money he paid to his insured
and the insured by accepting payment has lost his right to
demand payment of that sum from the tort-feasor. The in-
sured can claim all other damages over and above that
amount and the insurer has no claim to those damages.
Thus it is better to think of the insurer as an assignee of part
of the claim than to speak of the insured and the insurer as
joint owners of the claim. The Patitucci case also uses the
description of the insurer's rights as an "assignment." The
definition of subrogation given in American Jurisprudence is
the "doctrine of substitution," and it later states that subro-
gation contemplates full substitution and places the party
subrogated in the shoes of the creditor. "Substitution" im-
plies the displacement of the original party and reinforces
the conclusion that the insured and the subrogated insurer
dural, is invoked to impose the substantive bar of limitations of actions, and com-
mencement by one of the interested parties should have been effective to toll the statute
as to the entire claim. See Clausen & Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Proce-
dure: Chapters 801-803, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 74-77 (1976) [hereinafter The New Wis-
consin Rules].
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are not joint owners of any part of the claim against the tort-
feasor, although an adjudication of the tort-feasor's total lia-
bility requires the presence of both of the co-owners of the
claim as plaintiffs.42
The court also agreed with the insured that the purpose of
the mandatory joinder statutes is to protect the defendant
against a multiplicity of suits. It observed that such purpose is
served when, by operation of the statute of limitations, the
insurer is barred forever from asserting any claim against the
defendant: "There is, in effect, no longer any lack of an indis-
pensable party for the insurer no longer has any interest in the
action. '4 3 As a result of such finding, the court allowed the
insured to proceed, in his action against the defendant, to seek
to recover all of the damages sustained less those to which the
insurer was subrogated. 4
Any procedural problems resulting from the decisions in
Patitucci and Heifetz, real or imagined, appear to have been
eliminated by the adoption of new civil procedure rules in
Wisconsin. For example, sec. 803.01(1) currently states:
[C]ommencement of the action by any of the persons hold-
ing a part of the claim will toll the statute of limitations as to
all, provided that within a reasonable time after objection is
made, the other persons holding part of the claim ratify the
plaintiff's commencement of the action or are themselves
joined or substituted in the action.45
42. Heifetz, 61 Wis. 2d at 120-21, 211 N.W.2d at 839.
43. Id. at 123, 211 N.W.2d at 841.
44. The impact of subrogation on the collateral source rule will be discussed in
Section IV of this article.
45. The New Wisconsin Rules, supra note 41, at 77, 86-89. A procedure in con-
formity with the new rule was apparently at work in Lambert v. Wrensch, 135 Wis. 2d
105, 399 N.W.2d 369 (1987), see supra note 28. The plaintiff in that action was injured
in an auto accident on May 19, 1978, and commenced the action against the tortfeasors
on May 11, 1981. with only seven days remaining under the statute of limitations.
Joined as a defendant was the insurer which provided nearly $18,000 in medical expense
benefits to the plaintiff following the accident. It was joined pursuant to Wis. STAT.
§ 803.03(2)(a) (1983-84). The insurer filed an answer on December 29, 1981, but did not
assert the subrogation interest until January 8, 1982, submitting an amended complaint.
The trial court, in a memorandum decision, dismissed the insurer's claim holding that
although the insurer held a subrogation interest, its failure to respond in a timely fash-
ion resulted in the running of the statute of limitations as to its claim. The trial court's
memorandum decision does not amplify upon the reason for dismissal. It appears that
although the plaintiff's commencement of the action tolled the running of the statute as
to the insurer, because of Wis. STAT. § 803.01(1), it was only tolled for a reasonable
time thereafter and, after the passage of a reasonable time, began to run again until it
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Thus, even though this arguably was the intent of the proce-
dure rules prior to Heifetz, 46 that intent is now clear.
Section 803.03(2) of the new rules also makes it clear that
the party asserting the claim for affirmative relief in an action
must join as parties those persons with subrogation claims.47
However, it gives one so joined the options of either partici-
pating in the prosecution of the action, agreeing to have his or
her interests represented by the party who caused the joinder,
or moving for dismissal with or without prejudice.
The new rules of civil procedure may also provide an effec-
tive mechanism to resolve another problem related to insurer
subrogation which has not as yet been discussed in this article.
Insurance claims personnel recognize that, at times, it might
be tactically advantageous not to make a claim payment to an
insured, thus avoiding subrogation rights. It is not uncom-
mon, for example, for an insurer to enter into a "loan receipt"
agreement with the insured when actual claim payment would
be prejudicial to the insurer under the terms of the insurance
contract.
In the leading case of Luckenbach v. McCahan Sugar Re-
fining Co.,48 the United States Supreme Court upheld the va-
lidity of the loan receipt agreement. In that case the plaintiff
expired. The issue of the propriety of the trial court's dismissal of the insurer was not
considered on appeal.
46. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
47. Wis. STAT. § 803.03(2)(b) (1983-84):
(b) Options afterjoinder. Any party joined pursuant to par. (a) may 1. partici-
pate in the prosecution of the action, 2. agree to have his or her interest repre-
sented by the party who caused the joinder, or 3. move for dismissal with or
without prejudice. If the party joined chooses to participate in the prosecution
of the action, the party joined shall have an equal voice with other claimants in
such prosecution. If the party joined chooses to have his or her interest repre-
sented by the party who caused the joinder, the party joined shall sign a written
waiver of the right to participate which shall express consent to be bound by the
judgment in the action. Such waiver shall become binding when filed with the
court, but a party may withdraw the waiver upon timely motion to the judge to
whom the case has been assigned with notice to the other parties. A party who
represents the interest of another party and who obtains a judgment favorable to
such other party may be awarded reasonable attorney's fees by the court. If the
party joined moves for dismissal without prejudice as to his or her claim, the
party shall demonstrate to the court that it would be unjust to require the party
to prosecute the claim with the principal claim. In determining whether to grant
the motion to dismiss, the court shall weigh the possible prejudice to the movant
against the state's interest in economy of judicial effort.
48. 248 U.S. 139 (1918).
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shipped a quantity of sugar on a ship owned by one of the
defendants and chartered by the other. The sugar was se-
verely damaged in transit and the plaintiff brought suit to re-
cover for the damage. The carrier argued that it was entitled
to credit for the amount paid to the plaintiff by its insurer.
The cargo had been shipped under a bill of lading which pro-
vided that the carrier defendant would receive the benefit of
any insurance the plaintiff had obtained on the goods. The
insurance policy provided that the insurer would not be liable
for any damages if a bill of lading attempted to secure the
benefit of the insurance for a carrier. The plaintiff asserted
that the amount received from the insurer was a loan and not
a payment. Thus, the liability of the insurer under its policy
was contingent. If the carrier was liable to the insured, the
policy exclusion would be effective and the insured would
have to repay the loan. If the carrier was not liable, the provi-
sion in the bill of lading would be meaningless, the liability of
the insurer to its insured would be fixed, and the loan would
not have to be repaid. Payment by the insurer under the pol-
icy without the "loan-receipt" agreement would have resulted
in a waiver of the exclusion. In such a situation the insurer
would have no subrogation rights against the carrier.49
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized that in
cases like Luckenbach, where the insurer's liability to its in-
sured under the policy is contingent and not fixed, "loan-re-
ceipts" have validity. However, in Kopperud v. Chick,50 the
court stated:
The loan receipt and agreement has a proper and legiti-
mate place in the adjustment of losses under insurance poli-
cies but the device is unavailable and improper in this state
to cover up a suit based on subrogation or to obtain the same
results as the enforcement of subrogation rights. The court
will not recognize the transaction as a loan if the insurer's
right to demand repayment of the loan is in substance its
right to subrogation parading in disguise. However, to expe-
dite prompt settlement of claims against insurance compa-
49. In such a case the carrier would become an additional insured under the ship-
per's policy and an insurer is generally not entitled to subrogation against its own in-
sured. See Rural Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 134 Wis. 2d 165, 170, 395 N.W.2d 776, 779
(1986).
50. 27 Wis. 2d 591, 135 N.W.2d 335 (1965).
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nies the loan-agreement device has been recognized when
payment would be prejudicial to the insurance company
under the terms of its policy.5 1
In some cases the tactical advantage which the insurer
may seek to gain from use of a "loan-receipt" is not the pres-
ervation of policy defenses and avoidance of waiver. It is sim-
ply an attempt to keep the identity of the real party in interest
from the trier of fact to avoid potential jury prejudice against
a plaintiff who is an insurance company. This is especially
significant in Wisconsin. With the direct action and direct lia-
bility statutes in this state, the liability insurer of a negligent
defendant may be joined in an action as a party-defendant. 2
Absent the ability to look behind a "loan-receipt" to deter-
mine its validity (or conversely whether it is really a disguise
for subrogation) the action could proceed so that it appears to
a jury that a poor, hapless plaintiff (the insured) is pursuing a
claim against a negligent defendant and a powerful, wealthy
liability insurer. With new civil procedure rule 803.03, and
guided by the analysis in Kopperud, a court should have the
necessary tools to look behind a "loan-receipt" to ascertain
the true purpose of the agreement and to join an insurer at-
tempting to disguise its subrogation rights.
IV. SUBROGATION AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
Various decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court have
tended to confuse the relationship between the operation of
subrogation principles and the collateral source rule. Simply
stated, the collateral source rule will not allow a tortfeasor to
reduce his damage liability resulting from harm caused to an-
other by benefits the injured person received from sources
other than the tortfeasor himself or one acting on the
tortfeasor's behalf.5 3 In essence, the collateral source rule is
both a rule of damages and a rule of evidence. Its operation
prevents a tort defendant from introducing evidence to prove
that the plaintiff incurred no medical expenses because the
51. Id. at 595, 135 N.W.2d at 337.
52. Wis. STAT. §§ 632.24 (direct liability) and 803.04(2)(a) (1985-86) (direct
action).
53. Payne v. Bilco, 54 Wis. 2d 424, 433, 195 N.W.2d 641, 647 (1972); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1979).
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plaintiff's insurer paid them, or no wage loss because a kind
employer continued wages during the disability.
The end result of the operation of the collateral source rule
is that in some cases the tort plaintiff may recover twice or
more for some elements of damages - once from the
tortfeasor who caused the harm and again from any source of
benefits collateral to the tortfeasor5 4 Such multiple recovery,
however, is the byproduct of the rule and not a principle of
the rule itself nor a policy at the foundation of the rule. The
Wisconsin courts' analysis of the interaction of subrogation
and the collateral source rule appears to confuse the result of
the operation of the rule with the principles which underlie
the rule itself.
A scant thirteen years after it had decided Gatzweiler v.
Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co., the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in Cunnien v. Superior Iron Works Co. ,56 used
Gatzweiler as authority for the proposition "that the amount
received by an injured party under an accident policy for
which he has paid the premiums cannot be considered by way
of partial or total satisfaction of damages claimed by such in-
jured person from a tortfeasor. ' ' 57 Six years later, again citing
Gatzweiler as authority, the court held:
It is equally clear that the defendant is not entitled to
have the damages reduced because the plaintiff had
purchased and paid for the right to have indemnity in case
he sustained accidental injuries. The sums paid for such in-
surance are in the nature of an investment, which, like other
investments made by the plaintiff, ought not to inure to the
benefit of the defendant. The only parties interested in such
a contract of insurance are the plaintiff and the insurer. 8
54. This has caused some to criticize the collateral source rule, especially in light of
the number of Americans who have these benefits available. See, e.g., Fleming, The
Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478 (1966);
Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741
(1964).
55. 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633 (1908).
56. 175 Wis. 172, 184 N.W. 767 (1921).
57. Id. at 187, 184 N.W. at 772.
58. Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 374-75, 214 N.W. 374, 376 (1927). See also
Merz v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 2d 47, 54, 191 N.W.2d 876, 879 (1971); Dehnart
v. Waukesha Brewing Co., 21 Wis. 2d 583, 595, 124 N.W.2d 664, 670 (1963).
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Later, in the case of Heifetz v. Johnson, previously dis-
cussed,5 9 the court made the following statement: "Accept-
ance of payment from an insurer operates as an assignment of
the claim to that extent whether or not the policy contains a
subrogation agreement. The plaintiff loses his right to sue for
any amount received from his insurer. ' 60 Subsequently, in
Rixmann v. Somerset Public Schools, also discussed previ-
ously,61 the court made the following observation concerning
the statement in Heifetz:
It has been noted that this language could, under a narrow
interpretation, be taken to mean that in any case in which
the injured party has been compensated for his loss by his
insurer, subrogation in favor of the insurer occurs. Thus, it
might be argued that the collateral source rule, which pro-
vides that a personal injury claimant's recovery is not to be
reduced by the amount of compensation received from other
sources such as insurance, has been eliminated in this state.62
It is difficult to understand how the statement from
Heifetz, under any interpretation, narrow or broad, could be
taken for anything more than what it actually was - a mis-
statement of the rule of Gatzweiler that subrogation would
only arise by operation of law from an insurer's payment
under an indemnity policy. Rixmann set the record straight
in that regard, but it added to the confusion already existing
between the interrelationship of subrogation and the collateral
source rule. True, Rixmann states that Heifetz did not abolish
the collateral source rule in Wisconsin; it points to authority
both before and after Heifetz to support that assertion. How-
ever, the court then quotes language from one of its previous
decisions, 63 dealing with the burden of proof in a contractual
subrogation situation and makes the following statement:
This language is important in two respects. First, by point-
ing to the lack of evidence giving the insurer a contractual
right to subrogation, the court applied the traditional, pre-
Heifetz, collateral source rule: "An accident insurance pol-
icy, in the absence of any express provision in the policy to
59. See supra discussion in Section II.
60. Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 124, 211 N.W.2d 834, 841 (1973).
61. See supra discussion in Section II.
62. Rixmann v. Somerset Pub. Schools, 83 Wis. 2d 571, 577, 266 N.W.2d 326, 329
(1978).
63. Karl v. Employers Ins. 78 Wis. 2d 284, 254 N.W.2d 255 (1977).
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the contrary, is held to be an investment contract ... [under
which] the insurance company is not subrogated to the
rights of the insured [upon payment]." Second, the court
indicated that the one seeking to prove subrogation has the
burden of introducing evidence to that effect.64
What the Rixmann court quotes from Patitucci is not any
form of the collateral source rule. It is nothing more than a
restatement of the Gatzweiler rule on "accident" contracts and
subrogation.
Subrogation, whether legal or conventional, has absolutely
no impact on the collateral source rule. If there is an insurer
subrogated to a portion of its insured's claim against the
tortfeasor, whether that subrogation was achieved by opera-
tion of law with an "indemnity" contract or contractually
with an "investment" contract, the tortfeasor's total damage
liability is not reduced. If both the insured and insurer are
successful in pursuing their separate claims, the tortfeasor will
pay the same total amount of damages caused by the tortious
conduct. Two separate payments will be made, however, in-
stead of the one which would have been made had there been
no subrogation. (This is usually because the injured person
was self-insured or had an "investment" policy without an ex-
press subrogation provision.)
Subrogation may eliminate the situation in which an in-
jured person will be compensated more than once for the same
harm. However, as noted previously, multiple compensation
of a person harmed by tortious conduct is not the principle
behind the collateral source rule. The policy underlying the
rule is to prevent the tortfeasor from benefiting, by reducing
the ultimate damage liability from sources of compensation
the tortfeasor did not provide.
Some might argue that the result in Heifetz impacted ad-
versely on the principle behind the collateral source rule. The
court in Heifetz held that since the plaintiff's insurer was sub-
rogated to a portion of the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff could
not recover that amount from the tortfeasor. In addition,
since the statute of limitations was held to have run on the
insurer's subrogation claim, the tortfeasor's total damage lia-
64. Rixnann, 83 Wis. 2d at 582, 266 N.W.2d at 331-32 (emphasis added and cita-
tion omitted) (quoting Karl v. Employers Ins., 78 Wis. 2d 284, 254 N.W.2d 255 (1977)).
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bility was reduced by the amount of the insurer's barred
claim. As the recent case of Lambert v. Wrensch 6 5 illustrates,
the result in Heifetz may continue to occur even with the new
procedure rules. However, when it does occur, it is not the
result of any impact of subrogation on the collateral source
rule. It was caused in Heifetz and Lambert simply because of
the failure of the subrogated insurer to timely pursue its legal
rights.
V. AND THEN CAME GARRITY AND RIMES
Although in the areas previously discussed subrogation
law in Wisconsin does not have consistency and logic as its
hallmarks, two decisions of the supreme court made all else
seem insignificant by comparison.
In Garrity v. Rural Mutual Insurance Co.,66 the supreme
court was confronted with a rather unique situation in a case
involving subrogation. One insurance company was both the
liability insurer of the party alleged to have caused the loss
and also the fire insurer for the party who sustained the loss.
The Garritys suffered a fire loss to their dairy barn for which
they were paid under their fire policy with the insurer. The
payment constituted the limits payable under that policy. The
total amount of the loss was in excess of the fire policy limits.
The Garritys claimed that the fire loss was caused by the neg-
ligent operation of a truck owned by a co-partnership and op-
erated at the time by one of its employees. The insurer had
issued a liability insurance policy on the truck which provided
coverage for the occurrence. In its answer to the Garritys'
complaint, the insurer denied that the negligent operation of
the truck caused the fire. The insurer also filed a third-party
complaint against itself, as the fire insurer of the Garritys, ask-
ing for a determination of its rights as the fire insurer to any
sum it might become liable to pay as the liability insurer.
65. 135 Wis. 2d 105, 399 N.W.2d 369 (1987). See supra note 45 and accompanying
text for additional discussion on this case and of the impact of the new rules of proce-
dure on the running of the statute of limitations as to a nonjoined, subrogated insurer.
In Lambert, however, confusion as to subrogation and the collateral source rule still
appears: "However, where subrogation is present, as here, the collateral source rule is
inapplicable." Id. at 121, 399 N.W.2d at 376.
66. 77 Wis. 2d 537, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977).
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The issue presented to the court by the facts of Garrity was
whether a subrogated insurer is entitled to recover from a
tortfeasor what it has paid to the insured before its insured
recovers tort compensation for the portion of the loss not cov-
ered by his insurance. Stated another way, the issue was
whether a subrogated insurer or its insured has priority when
both are in competition for reimbursement from the same lim-
ited source of funds. The trial court determined that the fire
insurer had priority to the limits of the liability policy. Since
the benefits paid by the insurer under the fire policy greatly
exceeded the limits under the liability policy, that ruling effec-
tively took the liability insurer out of the negligence action
brought by the insureds.
The supreme court reversed. It held that before a subro-
gated insurer may recover anything from a tortfeasor, its in-
sured must be made whole in terms of the insurance benefits
received from that insurer and the tort damages recovered
from the tortfeasor. In support of its ruling, the court relied
upon its prior suretyship cases in which it held that subroga-
tion does not arise for the surety until the principal debt has
been paid in full:
Various reasons are given for the rule, the primary one being
set out in Hamill, that a surety who is subrogated upon par-
tial payment of the debt becomes a competitor with the cred-
itor (here the insured). This would be less acceptable in a
noninsurance case than here, because in a noninsurance case,
"the liability of a surety for the remainder of the debt exists
as well after as before partial payment, and until the entire
debt is paid, the surety has no such equity as will entitle him
to the active aid of a court of equity." In the instant case,
however, the insurer's liability is limited and does not exist
after payment according to the terms of the policy.6 7
The court found that even though an insurer's liability is lim-
ited, as compared to a typical surety, most of the insurance
subrogation cases from other jurisdictions follow the common
law rule. Such cases hold that where either the insurer or in-
sured must, to some extent, go unpaid, the loss should be
borne by the insurer, since that is a risk the insured paid the
insurer to assume. The supreme court therefore held that
67. Id at 542, 253 N.W.2d at 514 (citing Hamill v. Kuchler, 203 Wis. 414, 426, 232
N.W. 877, 882 (1931) (citations omitted)).
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since the parties stipulated that the Garritys had not been
made whole for the loss they suffered, their insurer's right to
recover from the tortfeasor's liability insurance coverage
would be secondary to the right of the Garritys.
That determination did not totally resolve the matter,
however. The court further noted that the common law rule
as to priorities may be waived by provision in the contract of
insurance.6 Looking to the specific insurance contract, the
court found that the rights of the parties were determined by
the subrogation clause in the policy, derived from statutes, 69
and discovered nothing in the clause to change the common
law rule. In addition to the policy subrogation provision, the
Garritys also executed a "subrogation receipt" for the fire pol-
icy benefits received. However, the court held that no such
receipt could change the rights of the parties as determined
by the statutory provision respecting subrogation. The court
also noted that whether the insurer is considered a "subrogee"
or "assignee" of the insured's rights makes no difference re-
garding the priority of recovery from the tortfeasor.7 °
Garrity, the writer recalls, did not cause much consterna-
tion to those concerned with insurance subrogation. Many
believed that it had limited application, especially since it
dealt with a property loss as to which damages are rather eas-
ily fixed and also because it involved a rather uncommon situ-
ation in which a subrogated insurer was competing with its
own insured for the source of funds it already held as the ad-
verse party's liability insurer.71 To many, it was inconceivable
that Garrity could be applied to the typical personal injury
68. Garrity, 77 Wis. 2d at 543, 253 N.W.2d at 515 (citing COUCH ON INSURANCE
2D § 61.61 (1968)).
69. At the time the fire policy was entered into Wisconsin had a standard fire policy
form prescribed by statute. Wis. STAT. § 203.01 (1969).
70. Garrity, 77 Wis. 2d at 546, 253 N.W.2d at 516. The court again was referring
to its statement in Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 120, 211 N.W.2d 834, 839 (1973).
that "it is better to think of the [subrogated] insurer as an assignee of part of the claim
than to speak of the insured and insurer as joint owners of the claim." Garrity, 77 Wis.
2d at 546, 253 N.W.2d at 516. The court viewed the difference between an assignment
and an equitable right to a cause of action as that the express assignment "has the effect
of benefiting the insurer by making it unnecessary for it to prove the existence of the
facts justifying subrogation, for it can rely on the express assignment." Id. at 546, 253
N.W.2d at 516, (quoting COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D, § 61.105).
71. Elliott, Subrogation in Wisconsin or What "Rines" With Confusion, 56 Wis.
BAR BULL. 12, 14 (Nov. 1983) [hereinafter Elliott].
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action in which an insured's claim against the tortfeasor has
many different damage components, some easily fixed and
others not, and where total damages could be reduced under
the Wisconsin comparative negligence rule.
Nevertheless, the view of those who believed that Garrity
applied more broadly was confirmed on March 2, 1982, when
the court decided Rimes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co.72 Rimes was involved in an auto accident with
three other vehicles. He received $9,649.90 from his own in-
surer, State Farm, whose policy contained a conventional
subrogation agreement. Rimes and his wife commenced a
personal injury action against the other three drivers and their
insureds. State Farm was joined in the action because of its
possible subrogation rights due to the medical payments.
Prior to the commencement of the trial, one of the defendant
drivers and his insurer were dismissed from the action with
prejudice by stipulation of all the parties. On the same day
the remaining parties entered into a stipulation providing that
State Farm had "a subrogation interest in recovery of those
medical bills and expenses as a result of the payments made"
under the medical payments coverages.73
On the second day of trial, Rimes and his wife settled all of
their claims with the remaining defendants for the sum of
$125,000. One of the liability insurers, American Family,
paid $50,000, its policy limits, on behalf of its insured. The
other liability insurer, Travelers, paid $75,000 of its $300,000
policy limits for its insured. A stipulation entered into among
the parties provided that $9,649.90 of the $75,000 paid by
Travelers was paid into court to be held in escrow until State
Farm's subrogation claim was resolved. The balance of Trav-
elers' payment went directly to Rimes, his wife, and their at-
torneys. The stipulation and order was signed by all parties,
including State Farm. Under its terms, all claims were re-
solved except for the issue between Rimes and State Farm as
to entitlement to the escrowed money. The defendants and
their liability insurers were then given general releases by the
Rimes.
72. 106 Wis. 2d 263, 316 N.W.2d 348 (1982). Prior to Rimes. no other reported
decision further explained the principles of Garrit.
73. Id. at 267, 316 N.W.2d 351.
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By agreement between Rimes and State Farm, a two day
trial was then held to the court regarding entitlement to the
escrowed funds. Evidence was taken not only as to the extent
of the damages sustained by Rimes and his wife as a result of
the accident, but also as to the issue of liability of all of the
drivers.
The trial court determined that the total damages sus-
tained by Rimes and his wife were $300,433.54, and that
Rimes was not negligent. Relying on Garrity, it concluded
that only the damages it found would make the Rimes whole
and that, because of the $125,000 settlement, State Farm had
no right of subrogation. It ordered the escrowed amount to be
paid to the Rimes. The supreme court accepted certification
of the case from the court of appeals.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court. It found that
the subrogation agreement before it was not significantly dis-
similar to the one it had examined in Garrity. Moreover, fol-
lowing the reasoning it had used in Garrity, it reaffirmed that
equitable principles apply to subrogation whether it is legal or
conventional. Thus, the insurer is not entitled to subrogation
unless the insured has been made whole for his loss:
The purpose of subrogation is to prevent a double recovery
by the insured. Under circumstances where an insured has
received full damages from the tortfeasor and has also been
paid for a portion of those damages by the insurer, he re-
ceives double payment - he has been made more than
whole. Only under those circumstances is the insurer, under
principles of equity, entitled to subrogation. Subrogation is
to be allowed only when the insured is compensated in full
by recovery from the tortfeasor. The insured is to be made
whole, but no more than whole.74
The court was not persuaded by the argument that Garrity
should not be applied in this case because Garrity arose from a
property insurance policy, where the wholeness of the insured
is more easily determined.7 5 The court was likewise unim-
74. Id. at 272, 316 N.W.2d at 353.
75. In rejecting this distinction the court stated:
The law of damages in personal-injury cases is premised upon the fact that the
damages are reasonably ascertainable. The trial of a personal-injury action is
based on that proposition, and we find the alleged difficulty of ascertainment of
actual damages to be irrelevant to the merits of this case. Particularly, it is irrel-
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pressed with the argument by State Farm that the Rimes' gen-
eral release to the tortfeasors constituted an affirmation by
them that they had been made whole as required by Garrity.
It found that this argument overstated the characteristics of a
release and settlement, particularly in a personal injury case.
It said in fact that the release in this case asserted just the
opposite of wholeness:
It is particularly apparent in this case that the release by
the plaintiffs was not an affirmation that they were made
whole, because the very escrow agreement arose out of the
contention by the plaintiffs that they were entitled to the
$9,649.90 as a portion of the sum for which they would set-
tle. By the escrow agreement contained in the stipulation it
is apparent that the plaintiffs, even if we were to assume that
they were acknowledging that the payment of $125,000
would be sufficient to make them whole, believed that
amount, less the $9,649.90, would make them less than
whole. Thus, by no ratiocination can it be concluded under
these circumstances that the plaintiffs' release of the
tortfeasors was an acknowledgment of wholeness.76
Concluding its application of the principles of Garrity to the
facts of this case, the court held:
Only if the insured's tort damages make him whole is he
required to disgorge the amounts by which he has been
indemnified, i.e., the insured cannot collect once in indem-
nity from the indemnitor and again in damages from the
tortfeasor without being compelled to respond in subroga-
tion. It is clear, in accordance with the general principles of
subrogation accepted by this court and stated in Garrity, that
the settlement in this case did not make the plaintiffs whole
and that only compensation in the sum of $300,433.54
would have been sufficient. It was that sum, and nothing
less, that would have sufficed to make the plaintiffs whole for
the injuries.71
This left one issue for determination - the propriety of
the "mini-trial" employed by the trial court to determine the
wholeness of the insured. The supreme court noted that, at
evant when, in fact, the procedures adopted by the trial court were designed to
determine with exactitude the actual damages sustained by Rimes.
Id.
76. Id. at 273-74, 316 N.W.2d at 354.
77. Id. at 276, 316 N.W.2d at 355.
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first blush, the procedure employed by the trial court ap-
peared to be awkward and inappropriate. It termed "unfortu-
nate" the fact that the parties could not settle all of their
differences. It further found that the position of State Farm
(which it apparently thought forced the mini-trial) was diffi-
cult to justify. Nevertheless, it concluded:
Be that as it may, the trial judge was confronted with a
problem that required judicial resolution. As unnecessary as
the procedure adopted should have been, we conclude that
the methodology utilized was appropriate. The assumption
on which the trial judge proceeded was that, under the cir-
cumstances, only a trial in which the various items of dam-
ages would be ascertained could determine what sum would
have made the plaintiffs whole. Regrettable as we consider
the necessity of having any trial at this tag end of a compli-
cated lawsuit, we conclude the trial judge proceeded
appropriately.v8
Unlike Garrity, Rimes was not a unanimous decision of the
supreme court. Writing in dissent, Justice Coffey argued that
there was a critical distinction between Rimes and Garrity.
He noted that in Garrity the insurer and insured were compet-
ing for a limited amount of liability insurance dollars, the re-
covery of which would indemnify neither. Here, he asserted,
it was the insureds' settlement for $125,000 which made the
remaining $225,000 of liability insurance unavailable to either
the insured or the insurer.79 The $350,000 in liability insur-
ance, once available, would have been enough to pay in full
both State Farm's claim and the Rimes' damages as found by
the trial court. He said that although the court has consist-
ently acknowledged that the purpose of subrogation is to
avoid unjust enrichment, the result in this case fosters unjust
enrichment of both the insured and the tortfeasor. He also
asserted that allowing actions by the insured, such as the set-
tlement here, to bar its insurer from its subrogation rights
78. Id. at 277, 316 N.W.2d at 356.
79. Id. at 280, 316 N.W.2d at 357. In fairness to the majority it should be noted
that State Farm signed the stipulation and order which resulted in this situation. Id.
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could be held to constitute a breach by the insured of his duty
of good faith and fair dealing to the insurer.8"
Justice Coffey also criticized the majority's sanction of
mini-trials, which he viewed as contrary to the interest of judi-
cial economy and inimical to the benefit supposedly gained in
the settlement of a claim. He asserted that mini-trials would
be unnecessary if the court would have ruled that whenever an
insured settles with a responsible tortfeasor, the subrogated
insurer is entitled to recover to a proportionate amount equal
to the insured's percentage of recovery of the actual loss
sustained.81
Justice Coffey's final observations about the majority deci-
sion was that it places the insurer in the untenable position of
having to disprove the claim of its own insured if it seeks to
prove by the mini-trial that the insured was made whole
through a settlement. This, he observed, pushes the insurer
and its attorney to the point of ethical dilemma because of the
confidential information which might be gathered in the
investigation of the insured's loss.8"
Justice Steinmetz began his dissent by noting that the ma-
jority had erroneously based its decision on the findings and
judgment of the trial court that the plaintiffs had not been
made whole by the settlement with the tortfeasors. As to that
factor, he stated:
[O]nce the plaintiffs' case was settled in full with the other
tortfeasors, there were no longer any "findings and judg-
ment" the court could render regarding the damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff. All the court could do was render an
advisory opinion which it did, and I find that inappropriate
and beyond the trial court's jurisdiction. S3
Justice Steinmetz also expressed the belief that the majority,
in relying on Garrity, had failed to give sufficient consideration
to its holding that the common law rule as to insured/insurer
priority may be modified by agreement of the parties. Unlike
the majority, he found significant differences between both the
80. Rmnes, 106 Wis. 2d at 282, 316 N.W.2d at 358 (citing Anderson v. Continental
Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978)), which spoke of a duty of good faith
and fair dealing on the part of each party to the insurance contract.
81. Id. at 283, 316 N.W.2d at 358-59.
82. Id. at 283-84, 316 N.W.2d at 359.
83. Id. at 285, 316 N.W.2d at 359.
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policy subrogation provisions and the subrogation agreements
in the two cases.A4
Garrity, as amplified by Rimes, created many new ques-
tions for those interested in the status of Wisconsin subroga-
tion law as it stood in their wake. 5 However, and
surprisingly, the state Office of the Commissioner of Insur-
ance (OCI) was apparently convinced that Rimes was the
model of clarty and would allow insurers to spell out,
through policy language, the respective rights of insurers and
insureds in all subrogation situations. The following appeared
in The Bulletin, a bi-annual publication of that Office:
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently decided a case
which will require insurers to revise the language currently
being used to describe subrogation rights in insurance poli-
cies. The decision is Rimes v. State Farm Mutual. The
court held that an insurer is barred from any subrogation
rights unless the insured is made whole for all elements of
damages as may be provided for by the settlement agree-
ment. Insurers should revise the subrogation language in
contracts which have already been approved to comply with
this decision. Those changes should be submitted to the
Rates and Forms Bureau of the Commissioner's office by
June 1, 1983. All new forms being submitted should contain
language describing subrogation rights accurately.8 6
Despite OCI's oblivion to the obvious questions that Garrity
and Rimes left unresolved, those questions remained. Some of
them, however, have been answered by subsequent decisions
of the Wisconsin courts.
In Vogt v. Schroeder,8 7 the court was confronted with the
issue of whether an underinsured motorist carrier, after pay-
ment to its insured, would have any subrogation rights against
84. Id. at 287, 316 N.W.2d at 360.
There is a distinction in the two clauses; in Garrity the right of recovery of the
insured governs, and in the present case the proceeds of any settlement are
pledged for payment. The plaintiffs are presumed to know the language of their
contract and should be bound by it, and, at least equitable determinations should
not ignore the language of the contract.... In this case the receipt clearly made
the interest of the company paramount in any money paid, pursuant to the cov-
erage, to the insured.
Id. at 288, 316 N.W.2d at 361 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
85. See Elliott, supra note 71.
86. THE BULLETIN 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1983) (citation omitted).
87. 129 Wis. 2d 3, 383 N.W.2d 876 (1986).
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an underinsured motorist. Progressive Casualty, which is-
sued Schroeder's liability coverages, argued that no underin-
sured motorist carrier can ever have any subrogation rights
since Garrity and Rimes stand for the proposition that the sole
purpose of insurer subrogation is to prevent double recovery
by the insured. As to this the court stated:
The teaching of Garrity and Rimes is not the simplistic
rule that is urged by Progressive Casualty to be of universal
application in all subrogation cases. Rather, it is that subro-
gation depends upon the application of equitable principles
to the facts of the case. Garrity and Rimes, although involv-
ing different types of insurance, were basically the same case
- who was to have priority, the insured or the insurer,
where the total payments, including possible subrogation re-
covery, still would not make the insured whole.
The question here is a different one: Whether an auto-
mobile insurer, which by the terms of its contract pays its
own insured under the underinsured motorist coverage, has
a right of subrogation against the tortfeasor (the underin-
sured motorist) once a payment has been made to its own
insured.8
The court concluded that the underinsurer has the right of
subrogation to the extent that it has paid benefits to its own
insured prior to the release of the tortfeasor and the
tortfeasor's liability insurer. Referring to the subrogation pro-
vision of the underinsured policy,89 the court stated:
As this policy provision makes clear, a subrogation claim
may not be pursued until payment has been made by the
underinsured carrier; nor can subrogation be asserted after
the tortfeasor has been released. Thus, in order to accom-
plish a just result, to put the burden of final payment upon
the tortfeasor for the amount in excess of his coverage and to
88. Id. at 15-16, 383 N.W.2d at 881.
89. Id. at 9, 383 N.W.2d at 878. The pertinent portion of the policy provided:
In the event of any payment under this policy, we are entitled to all the rights
of recovery of the person to whom payment was made against another. That
person must sign and deliver to us any legal papers relating to that recovery, do
whatever else is necessary to help us exercise those rights and do nothing after
loss to prejudice our rights.
When a person has been paid damages by us under this policy and also recov-
ers from another, the amount recovered from the other shall be held by that
person in trust for us and reimbursed to us to the extent of our payment.
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give the insured the proceeds of the settlement offered by the
underinsured's insurer without the necessity of a costly law-
suit, it is necessary for the underinsurer to make payment to
its own insured without releasing the tortfeasor.90
Although concurring in the result, Justice Steinmetz wrote
separately in an attempt to resolve misperceptions which he
thought might arise from the opinion of the majority. One of
these concerned limitations upon the underinsurer's options in
a factual setting such as that presented by this case. He ex-
pressed the fear that the majority opinion could be construed
to require an underinsurer to always substitute its funds for
the offered settlement of a tortfeasor. He expressed the belief
that if the underinsurer paid its benefits and gave notice
thereof to the tortfeasor, a subsequent release obtained by the
tortfeasor from the insured (of the underinsurer) would not
defeat the subrogation rights of the underinsurer.91
Another question resulting from Garrity and Rimes was
whether their principle of making an insured whole before an
insurer was entitled to subrogation had any application to sub-
rogation in an action by an injured worker against a third
party under section 102.29 of the Wisconsin Statutes.92 The
court of appeals addressed that issue in Martinez v. Ashland
Oil, Inc. 9 In that case, a wrongful death action based on
third-party liability under section 102.29 was commenced
against Ashland Oil by the surviving spouse and child of a
deceased worker. The parties entered into a settlement
whereby Ashland agreed to pay $100,000 to the plaintiffs.
The workers' compensation insurer moved for distribution of
the proceeds of the settlement pursuant to section 102.29(1).
The plaintiffs objected, claiming that only after they were
made whole would the compensation carrier be entitled to
subrogation. Both the trial court and the court of appeals dis-
agreed. The court of appeals noted that Garrity and Rimes do
not address the Worker's Compensation Act and the disburse-
ment of funds under section 102.29(1). It found that the
90. Id. at 19-20, 383 N.W.2d at 882-83.
91. Id. at 27-28, 383 N.W.2d at 886 (Steinmetz, J., concurring). So held Schmidt
v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983) relied upon by the Vogt majority to support
its decision.
92. Elliott, supra note 71 at 67.
93. 132 Wis. 2d 11, 390 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1986).
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Worker's Compensation Act was a legislatively created substi-
tute for the common law rather than a supplement thereto.
Moreover, it found that workers' compensation was wholly
statutory and that questions regarding public policy should be
determined therefore by the legislature and not by the courts.
It held that given the nature of the workers' compensation law
and the limitations on Garrity and Rimes, as explained by the
supreme court in Vogt, the common law principle of "being
made whole" had no application to a third-party action under
section 102.29 and the statutory distribution schedule set
forth therein. 94
In Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Home Mutual Insurance
Co.,95 the court of appeals considered an additional problem,
apparently unresolved by Garrity and Rimes. In that case, a
person injured in an automobile accident received compensa-
tion from his collision insurer for damage to his automobile.
The collision insurer notified the tortfeasor's insurer of its
payment and asserted subrogation rights. Thereafter, the
tortfeasor's insurer paid the accident victim $25,000 under its
bodily injury liability coverage, exhausting the per person
limit of that coverage. It also paid the accident victim an ad-
ditional $6,000 payment made under the property damage lia-
bility coverage. The collision insurer claimed entitlement
since it had already made its insured, the accident victim,
whole for the loss to his vehicle. It argued that allowing the
insured to keep the $6,000 from the liability insurer would
violate the principle of Garrity and Rimes that subrogation is
intended to avoid double recovery by an insured. The court of
appeals also disagreed. The court noted that even with the
monies received from both the collision insurer and the liabil-
ity insurer, the accident victim had not recovered for all of the
damages he sustained in the accident. The test of Rimes, ac-
cording to the court, is thus, whether the insured has been
completely compensated for all of the elements of his dam-
ages, not merely those damages for which the insurer indem-
nified its insured.96
94. Id. at 13-16, 390 N.W.2d at 73-74.
95. 133 Wis. 2d 364, 396 N.W.2d 348 (Ct. App. 1986).
96. Id. at 366-69, 396 N.W.2d at 349-50.
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Two decisions by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the
spring of 1987 have further narrowed and refined the applica-
tion of Garrity and Rimes. In Blue Cross & Blue Shield
United v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 97 a medical/hospital
insurer, Blue Cross, paid over $10,000 in hospital charges on
behalf of Kyle Adams under a contract issued to his father,
Robert Adams. The charges resulted from injuries the
younger Adams sustained in an accident while he was a pas-
senger on a vehicle owned by Wisconsin Coach Lines, Inc.
The vehicle was insured by Fireman's Fund. Following its
payment, Blue Cross notified Fireman's Fund of its subroga-
tion rights. Thereafter, Blue Cross learned that the Adamses
had settled their personal injury claims with Fireman's Fund
for $40,000 less than that insurer's liability limits in its policy
with Wisconsin Coach Lines. Blue Cross thus initiated an ac-
tion against Fireman's Fund and the driver of the bus to re-
cover the amount it paid on behalf of the Adamses. The trial
court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted because Blue Cross failed to al-
lege that the Adamses had been made whole by the settlement
with Fireman's Fund. The court of appeals reversed.98
The supreme court on appeal began its analysis by noting
that in the past it had established that a subrogated insurer
has the right to enforce its subrogation rights despite a settle-
ment between its insured and the tortfeasor's insurer. It noted
that, in such a situation, it had characterized the interests of
the insurer and insured such that each owned separately a
part of the claim against the tortfeasor.99 Thus, the court con-
cluded, a settlement or recovery by the insured operates only
to satisfy the part of the claim owned by the insured. In this
case, therefore, since there was nothing to indicate that Blue
Cross agreed to the settlement entered into by the Adamses
and Fireman's Fund, the court concluded that Blue Cross had
97. 140 Wis. 2d 544, 411 N.W.2d 133 (1987).
98. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 132 Wis. 2d 62,
390 N.W.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that in light of Vogt, and its interpretation of
Garrity and Rimes, an allegation that the insured has been made whole is not essential
to the subrogation claim).
99. Blue Cross, 140 Wis. 2d at 549, 411 N.W.2d at 134. See supra notes 37 and 69
and accompanying text. The court apparently continues to have difficulty in determin-
ing whether "owner" or "assignee" is the better term.
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a cause of action to recover from the tortfeasor and its liability
insurer. "
The supreme court further disagreed with the contention
of Fireman's Fund that under Garrity and Rimes the subro-
gated insurer may not recover until it demonstrates that its
insured has been made whole. The court recalled its prior de-
cision in Vogt where it stated that Garrity and Rimes did not
establish an absolute rule, and then commented:
We agree with the court of appeals that the compelling
equitable factor which defeated the subrogation right as-
serted in both Garrity and Rimes (the prospect of an insurer
competing with its own insured for funds which are insuffi-
cient to make the insured whole) is not present in this case.
There are two factors which combine to distinguish the pres-
ent case from Garrity and Rimes. First, Blue Cross in this
action is not seeking to recover any funds from the Adamses.
The complaint filed by Blue Cross seeks recovery from the
tortfeasor and his insurer; it does not look to the funds of its
insured as a source of recovery. Thus, the insurer is not di-
rectly competing with its insured for a limited set of funds.
Second, the Adamses had already settled their part of their
claim with the tortfeasor before Blue Cross initiated its suit
against the tortfeasor.101
The court also made it clear that if the insured has not
settled with the tortfeasor prior to his insurer's initiation of a
subrogation action, the insured will be protected by the Gar-
rity/Rimes doctrine because the insured must be joined in that
action. 0 12 The court labeled as "spurious" the argument of
Fireman's Fund that the mere existence of a subrogated in-
surer's cause of action will reduce settlement offers to the in-
sured and thus reduce the funds which would otherwise go to
the insured in derogation of Garrity and Rimes. The court
observed that the choice to settle or pursue a tort action, de-
spite its ruling in this case, remains entirely in the hands of the
insured. Thus, the court observed, "regardless of the exist-
100. Id. at 549, 411 N.W.2d at 134-35.
101. Id. at 550, 411 N.W.2d at 135. See also supra note 40.
102. Id. at 552 n.4, 411 N.W.2d at 136 n.4. The statutory basis for this holding is
WIS. STAT. § 803.03(2)(a) (1985-86).
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ence of an independent claim in the subrogated insurer, the
injured party retains the ability to be made whole."' 3
The final issue which the court addressed in Blue Cross
concerned the assertion by Fireman's Fund that its agreement
with the Adamses would require them to indemnify Fireman's
Fund for any claim by Blue Cross against the Fund, in contra-
vention of the Garrity/Rimes doctrine. The court disagreed,
restating the fact that a separate claim by Blue Cross would
not result in competition between it and its insured for the
same funds. The court then stated: "Were we to recognize
that the existence of an indemnity agreement would bar any
claim by a subrogated insurer, all subrogation claims could be
barred through the use of indemnity agreements, and our rec-
ognition of an independent claim in the insurer would be
meaningless."'04 In a footnote, the court observed that it was
not passing on the validity of such an indemnity agreement
between the tortfeasor and the injured party, but noted that
one court has found such an agreement void as against public
policy. 105
The companion case of Blue Cross is Mutual Service Casu-
alty Co. v. American Family Insurance Group.10 6 Justice Cal-
low again wrote the decision for a unanimous court. The facts
of the case are very similar to Blue Cross, but contain one
novel twist which makes one wonder why some Wisconsin in-
surers, so troubled by Garrity and Rimes, appear so prone to
want to continue shooting themselves in the foot by attempt-
ing to further complicate the law. Here one insurer attempted
to recreate a Rimes factual setting to gain an advantage over
another insurer.
Mutual paid its insured $2,000 under the medical pay-
ments coverage of her automobile insurance policy after her
car was struck from the rear by the insured of American. Mu-
tual thereafter notified American of its subrogation interest.
Mutual's insured, through her attorney, filed a claim against
American for the injuries resulting from the accident. Some-
103. Blue Cross, 140 Wis. 2d at 553, 411 N.W.2d at 136.
104. Id. at 554, 411 N.W.2d at 136.
105. Id. n.6, 411 N.W.2d 136 n.6 (citing Allum v. MedCenter Health Care, Inc.,
371 N.W.2d 557, 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)).
106. 140 Wis. 2d 555, 410 N.W.2d 582 (1987).
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time later, Mutual's insured negotiated a settlement with
American. As a result of the settlement, American issued two
checks - one payable to Mutual's insured and her attorney in
the sum of $7,900 and another in the sum of $2,000 payable to
the insured, her attorney, and to Mutual. Mutual requested
that the $2,000 check be endorsed over to it, but its insured
refused.
Thereafter, Mutual filed suit against American to recover
the $2,000 it had paid to its insured under her medical pay-
ments coverage. American answered that it had discharged
its responsibility to Mutual by issuing the $2,000 check made
payable to Mutual, its insured, and her attorney. The trial
court subsequently dismissed American from the action find-
ing that it discharged its obligation to Mutual by including it
on the $2,000 check. 10 7
The supreme court held that American should not have
been dismissed. Using the same doctrinal foundation as in
Blue Cross, the court concluded that the settlement between
Mutual's insured and American neither involved Mutual as a
party to the settlement nor provided for the payment of Mu-
tual's subrogated interest. It found that absent some indica-
tion that Mutual's insured had authority to settle that part of
the claim owned by Mutual, her agreement with American
could not and did not impair Mutual's right to enforce its part
of the claim. For American to satisfy its obligation to Mutual,
the court observed, it must either obtain a separate release
from Mutual (of Mutual's claim) or issue a separate check
payable to Mutual alone.' 8
Although the decisions which followed Garrity and Rimes
appear to have resolved many of the major issues created and
left unresolved by those two cases, one has yet to be addressed
directly by the Wisconsin courts. That issue concerns the ap-
plicability of a statute of limitations to the subrogated in-
surer's claim against the tortfeasor.10 9
107. Id. at 560, 410 N.W.2d at 583.
108. Id. at 563, 410 N.W.2d at 585.
109. Elliott, supra note 71 at 15, suggests three possible dates when the statute
commences to run: (1) the date of the injury to the insured; (2) the date of the insurer's
payment to the insured; or (3) the date the insured concedes, or it is determined that he
or she has been made whole. Id.
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As the subsequent analysis discloses, however, if there is
any doubt as to the statute of limitations which is applicable
to the subrogated insurers's claim, it should be very easily re-
solved. As discussed previously, subrogation results in the
substitution of the insurer for the insured as to a portion of the
insured's claim against the tortfeasor. 10 The insurer thus
steps into the shoes of the insured and, as the insured's alter
ego, the applicable statute of limitations is that which would
govern the insured's claim if there had been no subrogation.1 1
Another issue, only facially more difficult, is whether the
insurer's subrogation claim will accrue, and the statute begin
to run, on a date different than that of the insured's claim. As
a result of Garrity, Rimes and their progeny, it is relatively
clear that an insurer's right to recover on its subrogation
claim remains inchoate until such time as the insured is made
whole, or at least until the insured is not in the position of
competing with the insurer for the same source of funds. Ad-
ded to this is the fact that it was not until after Rimes that
Wisconsin adopted a discovery rule to be applied with the
statute of limitations and to govern all tort actions other than
those already governed by a legislatively created discovery
rule."12 Under the discovery rule, as later amplified, 13 an ac-
tion accrues and the statute begins to run when the plaintiff
discovers, or with reasonable diligence should discover, that
he or she has sustained harm and that the defendant is associ-
ated with the cause of that harm. In Wisconsin it has tradi-
tionally been held that a claim is deemed to accrue when there
is a "claim capable of present enforcement, a suable party
against whom it may be enforced, and a party who has a pres-
ent right to enforce it." 114
Does all of the foregoing mean that although a subrogated
insurer has three years to pursue its subrogation claim, just as
its insured has to pursue his or her personal injury claim, 'J
110. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
111. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Wis. 2d 25, 130 N.W.2d 296
(1964).
112. Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).
113. Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986).
114. Crawford v. Shepherd, 86 Wis. 2d 362, 365-66, 272 N.W.2d 401. 402 (1978).
115. Under WXis. STAT. § 893.54 (1985-86); and, six years for injury to property
under Wis. STAT. § 893.52 (1985-86).
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the clock as to each begins to run on a different date? Is the
date for the insurer that on which it and its insured, for
whatever reason, are in a position when they can no longer
compete for the same funds?
An affirmative answer to these questions would confuse
the ability to enforce a claim with the ability to actually col-
lect damages on the claim that is enforced. It must be
remembered that in both Garrity and Rimes the insurer and
its insured were in competition for a limited source of funds.
Neither case involved the issue of whether the subrogated in-
surer could pursue its claim against a tortfeasor to judgment.
The cases involved only the issue of the priority of payment of
the competing claims of a subrogated insurer and its insured.
It could hardly be argued that a statute of limitations would
not begin to run on a claim against an impoverished tortfeasor
until he or she had a source of funds to pay the potential
judgment.
In addition to the foregoing it must be remembered that
under section 803.03(2) of the statutes, if the insured com-
mences an action against a tortfeasor, the subrogated insurer
must be joined. The same section provides that if the subro-
gated insurer is the first to commence an action, the insured
must be joined. When those provisions are considered to-
gether with section 803.01, which tolls the statute if only one
party holding part of a claim commences the action,' 16 it is
abundantly clear that not only does the subrogated insurer
come under the same statute of limitations as its insured, but
also that the clock starts running for each at precisely the
same time.
VI. CONCLUSION
Much water has passed over, under, around and through
the judicial dam since the supreme court articulated the first
principle affecting insurer subrogation in Wisconsin. Clarity
has not always been the product of the courts' decisions. The
indemnity/investment dichotomy still remains a troublesome
issue and probably more so now than in the past due to the
new gloss Cunningham v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co." 7
116. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
117. 121 Wis. 2d 437, 360 N.W.2d 33 (1985).
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has added. What most once thought would qualify as an in-
demnity contract may now fail to qualify because of Cunning-
ham. Such failure may occur not because the policy fails to
reimburse the insured for actual losses incurred, but because
the langauge of the policy fails to limit the insured to one in-
demnity for loss and no more. The court, even within the last
year, has demonstrated difficulty in sorting out the collateral
source rule from principles of subrogation. Still, the last year
has seen new clarity develop as to the issue of priority between
insured and subrogated insurer in competition for a limited
source of funds from a tortfeasor. Since Garrity v. Rural Mu-
tual Insurance Co. 1 8 and Rimes v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. " 9 have now been fairly well sorted out
and refined, 2 ' the remaining unsettled issues involving insurer
subrogation in Wisconsin are, in candor, probably insignifi-
cant. Considering the track record of the Wisconsin courts on
subrogation issues over the past century, it is difficult to pre-
dict the future development of the law. On matters such as
that it is much better to be a jockey than a bookie.
118. 77 Wis. 2d 537, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977).
119. 106 Wis. 2d 263, 316 N.W.2d 348 (1982).
120. There will probably be very few situations in which a subrogated insurer will
allow itself to be in the position of competing with its insured thus forcing a true Rimes
situation. However, this can still occur. See, e.g., Wilmot v. Racine County, 136 Wis.
2d 57, 400 N.W.2d 917 (1987).
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